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Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate?*
Robert B. Barsky 
University o f  Michigan, and NBBR
J. Bradford De Long 
Harvard University, and NBER
April 1992
Abstract
Large long-run swings in the United States stock market 
over the past century correspond to swings in estimates 
of fundamental values calculated by using a long moving 
average of past dividend growth to forecast future growth 
rates. Such a procedure would have been reasonable i f  
investors were uncertain of the structure of the economy, 
and had to make forecasts of unknown and possibly- 
changing long-run dividend growth rates. The parameters 
of the stochastic process followed by dividends over the 
twentieth century cannot be precisely estimated even 
today at the century's end. Investors in the past had even 
less information about the dividend process.
JEL No:
*We would like to thank George Bulkley, Robert Shiller, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence 
























































































































































































The U.S. slock market has exhibited large fluctuations relative to 
the baseline of the ex post "perfect-foresight" fundamental-the 
actual value, discounted at a constant real rate, of the future  
dividends actually paid. At times the real SlkP stock market index 
plotted in figure I has been more than twice, and at times less than 
half of what its smoothly-growing ex post perfect-foresight value 
turned out to be.1
Figure 1
The Real Value of the S&P Composite Index, and the Ex Post 
Realized Present Value of Future Dividends, 1880-1991
•L o g  of Reai Stock Index Price 
+  Log of Ex Post'Present Value (6% Discount Rate)
Shiller [ 1989, ch. 5; a reprint of Shiller, 1981 ] and LeRoy and Porter 
[1981] argued that such high volatility relative to perfect-foresight 
fundamentals posed severe difficulties for the efficient markets
l The S&P composite is taken from Standard and Poor's Securities Price index Record 
and from Cowles et al. [1939], The data series from 1671 up to the la te - /980's is 
printed in Shiller [1969], Stock prices are real values fo r January. Dividends are 
totals for the year divided by the year's average producer price level. In calculating 
perfect-foresight fundamentals, he present value of post-sample dividends is 



























































































hypothesis.2 The current price can be seen of a forecast of the 
perfect-foresight fundamental; one implication of rafionality is that 
forecasts vary less than the realized values of the quantities 
forecast;3 *yet in figure I the implicit forecast given by the market-the 
real value of the stock index-is much more volatile than the realized 
perfect-foresight fundamental t Thus the market exhibits "excess 
volatility."
This paper sets forth a theory of the mechanism underlying excess 
volatility. The high volatility of the U.S. stock market could be in large 
part accounted for i f  investors formed their valuations of the stock 
market by extrapolating past dividend growth into the future. Investors 
would naturally do so i f  they believed that the dividend process was 
subject to both transitory and permanent shocks to dividend growth 
rates, or i f  they believed that there was a chance that the process was 
sub ject to permanent growth rate shocks. The past century's worth of 
observed dividend growth would not lead an investor to re ject a prior 
belief in such permanent growth rate shocks.
The interpretation advanced here can be seen as a positive rational- 
expectations model of low-frequency stock market swings, focusing on 
the limited information known to investors ex ante and on the process
2Shilier also stresses other anomalies in asset pricing. See Shiller 11989, chs. 2, 12- 
18, 291
3l f  they varied more, a better forecast would simply shrink the original forecast 
toward its mean.
tAllen Kleidon [ 1986a and b] (see also Merton and Marsh ( 1987], among many others) 
argues that tests like Shiller [1989, ch. 5] are significantly biased i f  dividends 
contain a quantitatively important "unit root." The considerations adduced by Kleidon. 
however, appear too small to quantitatively account fo r excess variance in stock 
prices (see Shiller (1989, ch. 7, a reprint of Shiller, 1988]; also see Shiller [ 198b] and 
Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro [ 1985, 1990]). In addition, further studies have shown a 
case that dividends contain a substantial long-run mean-reverting component. This 
has further diminished the leverage of the considerations noted by Kleidon (see Shiller 
[ 1989, ch. 8; a reprint of Campbell and Shiller, 1988]). "Regression tests" have led to 
conclusions similar to those of the excess volatility literature (see fama and french 
( 1988] and Poterba and Summers ( 1988]). Overviews of the debate through 1988 and 




























































































by which they learn about the possibly-changing structure of the 
economy. Or i t  can be seen as a positive model of the less-than- 
rational investor heuristic-extrapolation-which creates excess 
volatility.
The argument proceeds in several steps, following this f irs t  
introductory section, the f irs t  part of section II shows that excess 
volati l ity  springs predominantly from a more than proportional 
response of prices to long swings in dividends. When dividend growth 
over the preceding generation has been rapid, the price-dividend ratio 
is high-not low, as would be the case i f  prices were rational- 
expectations forecasts of the present value of a stationary dividend 
process. The second part of section II argues that this pattern is 
consistent with the hypothesis that marginal investors form their 
expectations of future dividends by extrapolating past dividend growth 
rates. They take a long moving average of past dividend growth rates 
and project it into the future.
The discussion in section II is framed by writing warranted stock 
market values in the form of what Shiller [I  9897 calls the Gordon 
equation:5
D
( I ) p. = —
r -8,
in equation (1), Pi is the value of the stock market index, Dt is the 
current dividend paid on the index, r and gi are the appropriate long- 
run rates of discount, and of expected dividend growth. The variable gi 
is the "permanent" dividend growth rate in the sense used in the 
definition of "permanent" income.
The key insight is that the denominator r-g i is a small number.




























































































I reformation about the dividend process is scarce. The expected 
dividend growth rate gt is uncertain. Investors will inevitably revise 
their estimates of the growth rate gp Small shifts-a percentage point 
or so-in gr produce large proportional shifts-twenty-five percent or 
so-in the denominator of equation (I), r-gt. These shifts carry with 
them similar large percentage changes in the level of stock prices Pf. 
And the actual path of stock prices is closely tracked by the valuations 
of an investor who forms his expectation of gt by extrapolating past 
dividend growth into the future.
Section III  analyzes why investors might extrapolate. I t  argues that 
the long-run twentieth century growth rate of dividends was not known 
to investors at the century's beginning. Investors had to form and 
update their estimates of the underlying long-run growth rate. 
Moreover, they had to guard against the possibility that this long-run 
growth rate might shift.
In such an environment-where the parameters and perhaps the 
structure of the dividend process are unknown-it might be rational, 
and is certainly natural, to form forecasts of future dividend growth by 
extrapolation from a moving average of past dividend growth rates. 
Investors' lack of information about the economy in which they are 
embedded, and the slow process by which they learn about the 
prospective future, combine to make extrapolation of growth an 
intelligible and reasonable forecasting strategy.
Section III can be read as an argument that investors who adopt the 
procedure of extrapolating past dividend growth into the future are 
forming rational-expectations estimates of present values given their 
limited information and the process by which they learn about the 




























































































as an account of the psychological processes by which investors might 
adopt the less than rational heuristic of extrapolation which would lead 
to the failure of the efficient markets hypothesis, and to excess 
volatility. We are not sure that the difference between these two 
interpretations is testable.
The concluding section IV provides a brief summary of the 
argument.
II. The Price-Dividend Ratio and Expected Growth Rates
A  Dividends and Darnings
figure 2 plots real prices and dividends for the U.S. stock market 
from 1880 to the present. It shows that the large long swings in stock 
prices are roughly in phase with and somewhat larger than long swings 
in real dividends, from 1920 to 1929 log stock index prices rise by IM5 
while the log of dividends rises by 1.08. from 1999 to I9b9 log stock 
index prices rise by 1.63 while the log of the real dividends paid on the 
index rises by only 0.72. from 1969 to 1982 log stock prices fall by 
0.91, while log dividends paid fall by only 0.2b.
Note that year-to-year dividend changes become substantially less 
volatile after World War II. Large year-to-year changes in dividends 
become rare, as i f  the amount of dividend smoothing has substantially 
increased. The standard deviation of annual log changes falls from 
0.1 91 over 1880-1 939 to .081 over 1990-1981 .b
bUnder the assumption that annual changes are independent, this difference produces 

































































































iTipnf friniriitiTrr ■♦Hog of1?eacQivk3encJs/.C54fa6
2000
ffitgurz 3. plertts nrnxuatiMtitends and;rmztiaccauunting earnings of the SLP 
i/ttH&x,, 3htfflM/tnq tffnstt (BwmtMgs measu/rtEE aiissD show a sLutkssttanfiial shift 
1iawmdiyeBxm-tta)-yymxir smwaottfmess imtftreessomd half of 1tWi& sample. Such 
•Jhrh-i iim f f e  ppvmssssis, aft' sa/rmm^ss arraH dividend pxm^outs makes 
irms^tarr^' ttai&k off ddstterrrnim'm̂ fffree aanmwg£ dividend gmm/tth rate more 
diifftfixidU3untldtxftJUffaamttdm(dtsltxrrttipisdl^mirelev.ant. Ilfftihe variance 
coif dHurttemd dtwngss «dtafftls tmmr ttitnee•„ fins msnm ctividfemt! growth rate 
mjwi f̂W;_]ii 0 l l  dm ̂ 'ifMIngcmeBTflimee at ban.






























































































Real Stock Index Earnings and Dividends 
1880-1991
Year
figure 3 shows flnat decades that see rapidly rising dividends are 
times of rising real earnings as well. The relationship of long swings in 
dividends and earnings can be quantified by examining the association 
of multi-year changes in log dividends and earnings. A regression of the 
twenty-year change in log earnings on log dividends yields a coefficient 
of 1.33 over the entire sample. And the correlation of twenty-year 
changes is 0.70.8 The bulk of long swings in dividends reflect long 
swings in trend earnings, not shifts in payout ratios.
B. Excess Volatility and the Price-Dividend Ratio
figure P quantifies the relationship between long swings in prices 
and dividends by regressing twenty-year changes in log real stock index 
prices against twenty-year swings in the log real dividends paid on the 
index. The correlation is high: O.&P. More important, the elasticity of &




























































































stock price with respect to dividend changes is high. The regression 
slope is 1.61. Over a twenty-year horizon, each one percent increase in 
dividends is accompanied by an additional O.bl percent change in the 
same direction in the price/dividend ratio?
This high elasticity cannot easily be attributed to an endogenous 
reaction of dividends to factors unconnected with profitability making 
for high stock prices. Twenty-year changes in log prices are equally 
closely associated with the components of twenty-year changes in log 
dividends collinear with and orthogonal to twenty-year changes in 
earnings.
Figure 4
Long 20-Year Swings in Log Prices Regressed on 20-Year 
Swings in Log Dividends, 1890-1991
(20-Year Log Price Change) = 1.607(20-Year Log Dividend Change) - .089 
i f  = 0.703
This high elasticity imposes restrictions on the pattern of 
expectations of growth rates implicit in market prices.9 10 An elasticity
9The standard error allowing fo r overlapping data is 0.21b. Thus the null hypothesis 
that there is not a more than proportional response-thai the true slope coefficient is 
1.0-can be rejected at the .005 level.



























































































greater than unity is inconsistent with rational expectations, and 
models of dividends in which they contain a long-run component mean- 
reverting in levels, as implicitly assumed in Shiller [1989, ch. 5; a 
reprint of Shiller, I9&I]. Indeed, Shiller [1989, eh. I ; a reprint of 
Shiller, 1989] regards this high responsiveness of prices to dividends 
as an alternative way of stating the "excess volatility" puzzle.
The implications of such a high elasticity for investors' expectations 
of dividend growth rates are easily calculated. Holding discount rates 
constant in the framework of equation (I ), using to denote a partial 
derivative, and writing lower case "p" and "d" for the logs of prices 
and dividends, the elasticity of price changes with respect to dividend 
changes is approximately:'1





fo r  pf/df to be greater than one, expected future growth rates gt 
implicit in current market prices must be positively correlated with 
past shifts in dividends.12 Moreover, the relationship between expected 
future growth rates and past dividend changes must be strong. The r-g-t 
term in the denominator of equation (2) is on the order of 0.09. To f i t  
the 1.6 regression coefficient of twenty-year log price changes on
of low-frequency movements in stock prices relative to dividends cannot be 
attributed to independent shifts in the price deflator. Twenty-year swings in nominal 
prices are even more highly correlated with twenty-year swings in nominal dividends.
' 1Defining
8, = (r-go)S (1-<>-go»'E.(‘idt.i>1-0
Is the anticipated "permanent" dividend growth rate, the present value of all future 
dividend growth.
' 24lternatively the rate of discounf r could vary. We think that the line of research 
undertaken here is more promising than explanations based on changes in discount 
rates. I t  appears implausible to us that investors in the late 1920's or in the 19b0's 
anticipated lower than average real returns on their investments, fo r an explanation 
based on variation in discount rates rather than anticipated growth rates, see 




























































































dividend changes, each extra ten percent increase in dividends over 
twenty years-each increase of 0.5% per year in average dividend 
growth over a twenty-year period-must carry with i t  a shift from the 
beginning to the end of the twenty-year period in the value of the 
estimated gt of Q.2f%lyear. To account for the actual correlations, 
half of any shift in average dividend growth rates over a twenty-year 
period must be expected to persist indefinitely into the future.
C. Long Swings and Extrapolated Growth Rates
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation ( I ) gives an expression 
for the log stock price:
(3) Pt = d(- ln (r -g t)
Suppose representative investors form their expectations of the 
permanent dividend growth rate gt by extrapolating past dividend 
growth, using a simple geometric lag specification:
(q) g( = (l-e)Xe'Ad
i=0
Equation (9) is a parsimonious forecasting rule that leads to the 
required positive correlation between past changes in dividends Adt-i 
and expected future dividend growth rates gt.
This simple forecasting rule fits the low-frequency variation in real 
stock index prices over the twentieth century. Moreover, i t  does so for 
values of the parameter q that are close to one. figures 5 and b plot 
actual stock prices and "warranted" values constructed according to 
equations (3) and (9) for the parameter values 8 = .95 and 0= .97, 
respectively.13 Because q is near one, only a negligible part of year-to-



























































































year variance in dividend growth is the result of revisions in the long- 
run growth rate of dividends gf. Shifts in g/ account for I/POO of fhe 
variance of dividend changes in the case shown in figure 5, and for 
approximately I / 1000 in the case shown in figure b. Vet the 
implications for warranted prices are dramatic.
Figure 5
Actual and Warranted Real Stock Index Prices for 8= 95, 6% Real
Discount Rate 
1880-1991
• lo g  Actual Price +  Log Warranted Price,9=.95, r=.06
In both cases, because 0 is near one the forecasts of future dividend 
growth rates implicit in the warranted price series are a very long 
moving average of past dividend changes, in figure 5, 35 percent of the 
weight in the forecast of future dividend growth is placed on dividend 
growth more than twenty years in the past. In figure b, fully P0 
percent of the weight is placed on dividend growth more than th irty  
years in the past. Thus neither figure contains a warranted price series 
that places high weight on the very recent dividend growth experience 
Vet in figure 5 long swings in warranted prices are substantially 




























































































as, actual low-frequency long swings in the stock market.
Figure 6
Actual and Warranted Real Stock Index Prices for 0=97, 6% Real
Discount Rate 
1880-1991
#Log Actual Price ♦  Log Warranted Price. 0=.97, r=.06
Regressing twenty-year log changes in actual stock prices on 
twenty-year log changes in the warranted prices plotted in figure b 
(with 0= 97 and r = .06) produces a slope of 1.00 and an R2 of 0.73. The 
variance of twenty-year price changes is 0.353, but the variance of 
twenty-year price changes relative to shifts in the " warranted" price 
series of figure 6 is only 0.102 . '4 This f i t  between actual low- 
frequency movements In stock index prices and movements in 
warranted prices calculated by extrapolating past dividend growth 
should come as no surprise, fo r  0=97 and r = .06, the regression slope 
of twenty-year changes in calculated log warranted prices on changes 
in log dividends is I ,b2-almost exactly the 1.6 / slope plotted in figure 
H for the regression of actual twenty-year changes in log stock prices
,l*The standard error of the slope estimate correcting for the overlapping nature of 





























































































Nofe that a rule of thumb that took the future dividend growth rate 
(and also the required rate of discount) to be a constant, and marked 
real dividends up by a constant multiple, would not do badly in 
accounting for long-run stock price movements over the past century.15 
The amount of "excess vola ti l ity" in stock prices is an order of 
magnitude smaller when assessed in terms of the variability of the 
price-dividend ratio than when assessed in terms of the variability of 
prices. The variance of twenty-year log changes in the price/dividend 
ratio is 0.1 HO—only <tO% more than the variance of twenty-year changes 
in stock prices relative to the " warranted" price series of figure 6. But 
the regression coefficient of twenty-year log price changes on dividend 
changes is not 1.00. Instead, it  is l .b l.  Prices react more than 
proportionately to long swings in dividends, and this more than 
proportional reaction is both economically and s ta t is t ica lly  
significant,lb
III. Why Might Investors Extrapolate?
The previous section has shown that the bulk of the long swings in 
U.S. stock prices could be accounted for i f  investors formed their 
expectations of future dividend growth by extrapolating past dividend
l5 This was one of the major points of Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro [ITSSI. I t  also 
corresponds to Kieidon's 11986a and b] benchmark case, in which log dividends follow 
a random walk
lb The hypothesis advanced in this paper about the causes o f low frequency 
movements In stock prices is similar in structure to an interpretation proposed for 
the nineteenth century Gibson paradox. Investors determine warranted prices by 
marking up dividends by a multiple that depends on a growth rate, which is estimated 
from a long moving average of past growth. Long run moving averages of past growth 
are highly correlated with present levels. Movements in warranted prices appear an 
amplified version of long movements in dividends, ju s t as in the Gibson paradox 
nominal Interest rates appeared correlated not with the inflation rate but with the 
price level. See Barsky and Summers [19887, and Shiiler [1 989, ch. I f ;  a reprint of 




























































































growth Into the future. But for what reason might investors adopt such 
an extrapolative procedure? 7he f irs t  two parts of this section 
advance two reasons, first, extrapolation might be the correct strategy 
i f  the dividend process is subject to both transitory and permanent 
growth rate shocks. Second, extrapolation might be a risk-minimizing 
strategy for an investor uncertain of the nature of the dividend process 
who fears that there might be such permanent growth rate shocks: the 
past century's data on dividend growth does not contain enough 
evidence to dispel such fears.
The third part of this section argues that the presence of a short- 
run component in the dividend process that is mean-reverting in levels 
is not a reason for investors to assume away the possibility of 
permanent shocks to dividend growth rates. The two issues-short-run 
mean reversion and long-run shifts in growth rates-are largely 
separate, and the second has by far the more important implications 
for warranted valuations.
Moreover, economists today cannot precisely estimate the dividend 
process. Thus i t  seems unreasonable to find investors in the past 
culpable for failing to know then, with less data at their disposal, 
features of the dividend process that economists dispute today.
A forecasting Dividend Growth
Investors might well value the stock market by using a moving 
average of past dividend growth to forecast future growth i f  they had 
to estimate the underlying long-run dividend growth rate. Of the 






























































































all except the growth rate gt are easily observed. Current dividends can 
be read in the Wall Street Journal or, earlier, the Commercial and 
f inancial Chronicle. The rate ot discount can be assessed through 
introspection. However, information about the remaining variable gr~ 
the permanent growth rate of dividends-is scarce and unreliable.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that the permanent growth 
rate of dividends is a constant. No one would claim that estimated 
growth rates of profits and dividends derived from the years of rapid 
expansion of the railroad industry after the Civil War era have much 
relevance for forecasting profit  and dividend growth into the 21st 
century. Economic growth rates can and do change over generations. 
Since I 950 the growth rate of GDP per capita in West Germany has 
been more than 3 percent per year, while the growth rate in Argentina 
has been less than 1.5 percent per year. Yet the two countries were 
equally rich in 1950, and had seen their GDP per capita levels increase 
in step since before 1900.17 Examples could be multiplied: a prudent 
investor trying to assess "warranted" values should consider that his 
country might be like Argentina, where growth stalls, or become a 
Germany or a Spain, where growth accelerates.
A very simple time series model of log dividend growth that captures 
these considerations is:
(5) Ad = e( + 2,(l-0)et + g0
i=l
In equation (5), go is the permanent growth rate of dividends as of time 
0. The e /s are stochastic shocks to dividend growth that have not only a
l7See Barsky and De Long [1990], De Long and Lichengreen 11991], Germany's rapid 
post-1950 rate of growth is not due in any large part to recovery from and rebuilding 
after World War II. Such recovery and rebuilding had been substantially completed by 
1950. By I9b0 German national product per capita is above not only its pre-World 





























































































permanent effect on tine level (the lead et term in equation (5)) hut also 
permanent, albeit attenuated, effects on the growth rate of dividends 
(the (l-O)et-i terms under the summation sign in equation (5)). The 
growth rate of log dividends is thus an I MA( 1,1 ). At every period in the 
future the dividend growth rate expected as of time t  is the same:
(b) E(Adt+.}= gt = Ë a-e )e  +go
H
Thus the permanent dividend growth rate is just this same constant.
The log dividend process generated by equation (5) is, for 0 near one, 
close to a random walk. But it has a rate of d r if t  that is itself slowly 
time varying. As a result, information gathered in the distant past will 
over time become less and less relevant to determining the current 
underlying permanent rate of dividend growth, équation (5) thus 
captures the intuition that forecasts of the future should not pay 
much attention to the very distant past.
Neglecting higher-order variance-generated terms, the present 
value of future dividends that are expected to grow at a constant rate 
gt is:l&
1 &As (5) Is written, i t  is not completely correct to neglect such higher order terms. 
Taking them into account leads to the conclusion that the log dividend process (5) has 
an infinite expected present value of future dividends. With finite probability the 
growth rate becomes, and stays, larger than the discount rate.
Equation (5) can be rationalized as an approximation to a continuous time 
stochastic process in which the log level of dividends follows a Brownian motion about 
a mean rate of d rift that itself changes over time. There is such a process, with small 
"nuisance" terms in its specification, that has a well-defined expected present value 
equal to that given by equation (7): pt « dt - in(r - gt). The growth rate gt must evolve 
according to:
r a -e )V
^  =gb + o -e )o w t - J - — e dt
0
The log level of dividends dt must evolve according to:
t t 2
dt = do + Jgtdt + aEw , - j T  dt
0 0




























































































(7) p( = dt - ln (r -g t)
Équation (b) can be solved for the expected permanent dividend growth 
rate in terms of past dividend changes:
(8) gt = ( i-e )X 0lAdt.i
i=0
Equations (7) and (8) are identical to equations (3) and (9). Thus, 
under the dividend process (5), the warranted price series calculated 
according to equations (3) and (9), and exhibited in figures 3 and 9, are 
the rational-expectations forecasts of the present value of future 
dividends for given values of 0. The basic point comes from Muth 
[I9b0], I f  a variable-in this case dividend growth-is an !MA{\ ,1), its 
optimal forecast will be a long geometrically-declining weighted 
average of past values.
In this sense, extrapolation could be accounted for by investors' 
lack of information. The underlying dividend growth rate is not a known 
parameter read in each morning's Wall Street Journal. I t  is an unknown, 
plausibly time-varying, that has to be estimated. Therefore rational 
investors might well extrapolate past dividend growth into the future.
B. The Magnitude o f Growth Rate Shocks
i f  our argument depended on the existence of a "large" unit root in 
the dividend growth process-a unit root that made significant 
contributions to the year-to-year variance of dividend growth-it would 
be easily refuted. Many have found a random walk with constant d r if t  
to be a good f irs t approximation to the U.S. dividend process (see
integral in each equation-are quantitatively insignificant, they are on the order of 




























































































fhankiw, Romer, and Shapiro [I9&5], Kleidon [I9&b). However, the 
values of 0 equal fo 0.95 and 0.97 required to generate figures 5 and b 
correspond to a unit root in dividend growth that contributes only a 
very small share of year-to-year dividend growth volatility, and that is 
very hard to estimate empirically.
information about the form and the parameters of the dividend 
process was limited back at the beginning of this century. Information 
about the parameters of the dividend process is stil l limited today. 
Estimation of the iM A [ i , i )  of equation (5) produces a maximum 
likelihood estimate of 0 equal to 0.989, with an (asymptotic) estimated 
standard error of 0.023. However, the most important point is not that 
the likelihood is maximized for 0=0.989, with a lower bound to the 
(asymptotic) .95 confidence interval of 0.9*13. It  is that the data do not 
speak strongly about the value of 0.
further complicating inference is the lack of rapid convergence to 
the asymptotic distribution for Qnear one. Shephard and Harvey ( 1990] 
investigate the small sample behavior of estimates of the Muth-type 
tMAfi , i ) process considered here. They find that there is a disturbingly 
large probability of calculating a maximum likelihood estimate of 0 
equal to 1.00 even when 0 is less than one and there are permanent 
shocks. Thus even a finding of a maximum likelihood estimate of 0 equal 
to one would not be evidence that there are no permanent growth rate 
shocks. Shephard and Harvey [1990] report that for a sample size of 
50 and for a true 0 of 0.90, there is one chance in three that the 
maximum likelihood estimate will be at 0=/.OO.,q Our model has more 
than twice the number of observations available as does Shephard and 
Harvey's monte carlo study, but it requires an underlying 0 only one- 19
19Under the procedure providing the least chance of incorrectly estimating 0= / .00, 




























































































third as far from 1.00, so our model possesses less power to resolve 
differences of Qfrom 1.00 as does Shephard and Harvey's. Our own 
monte carlo simulations with a sample size of 120 and a true 
underlying 0 of 0.97 find that 36 out of 100 times the maximum of the 
likelihood is at 1.00.
Thus the sample size and the relative magnitude of permanent 
growth rate shocks are too small for estimation of equation (5) to be 
informative about values of 0 in the range needed to produce figures 
like 5 and b. An individual with a point belief that 0 was .95, or .97, or 
.99, or 1.0 in 18 7 1, who decided then to hold that belief until evidence 
forced a statistically significant rejection, would today still hold to his 
original prior opinion.
Little hinges on the nullia lternative framework. Rephrased in 
Bayesian terms, the likelihood function for the IMA(I,1) process with 
normal Innovations is sufficiently flat over the parameter 0 that an 
individual who in I&71 held a uniform prior for 0 over [0, I ] ,  would 
today hold a posterior with a relatively large variance. Since with a 
uniform prior the posterior is proportional to the likelihood, such an 
investor would hold a subjective distribution for 0 with a mean of .959, 
and a standard deviation of OPS 20
Whether an investor is a Bayesian or follows hypothesis-testing 
methodology, the parameters of equation (5) are not precisely 
estimated. An investor could find reason believe that permanent shifts 
in the rate of mean dividend growth are relatively large, and that the 
" true "  0=0.95- in  which case, as figure 5 showed, the warranted 
fluctuations in the stock market were significantly more volatile than 
the actual fluctuations of stock indices. An investor could perhaps
20He would think that there was a 90% chance that 6 was in [.91,1], a b0% chance 




























































































believe there are no permanent shifts in the rate of mean dividend 
growth-that the "true"  0=/ .00. In this case the stock market has been 
too volatile: it has been anticipating permanent shifts in dividend 
growth that have never occurred, and will never occur.
We have shown that an econometrician attempting in 1992 to detect 
a small unit root in dividend growth could not obtain precise estimates, 
even with 120 years of data. A fortiori an investor in the past-in 1929, 
1933, or 19b3-operating with the smaller sample of data then 
available could not determine whether 6 was really 1.00 or 0.97. 
Moreover, a risk averse investor would have allowed for the possibility 
of some permanent shocks to the dividend growth rate even i f  he 
thought that the most likely value for 0 was one, and thus that the 
permanent dividend growth rate was a fixed constant.
C. Mean Reversion
Some have argued that dividends over the twentieth century may 
have in fact followed a more complicated process, or succession of 
processes, than the simple random walk with varying d rif t  of equation 
(5). The autocorrelations of dividend growth suggest that the dividend 
process may contain a short-run mean reverting component (Shiller 
[I9&91; ch. 8 )2 '
Especially at longer horizons, the univariate impulse response of 
dividends to a given shock is not precisely estimated. A null hypothesis 
that the cumulative impulse response over twenty-five years is 1.5 
could not be rejected. At any horizon, the upper bound to the 95 21
21 Univariate estimates of impulse response functions produce point estimates that 
after nine years gi percent of an initial shock to the log level of dividends has been 
eroded away by the decay of a mean-reverting component. Estimates of impulse 
response functions at horizons of fifteen to twenty-five years produce point 




























































































percent confidence interval for the cumulative impulse response 
includes one. I t  is not possible to conclude from the univariate 
autocorrelations of the dividend process that i t  definitely contains a 
mean reverting component. Nevertheless, an investor who relied on the 
point estimates of the cumulative impulse response would expect 
recent movements in dividends to be partially reversed over the next 
eight years or so, and would place negative weight on recent dividend 
growth in estimating warranted values.
However, such a mean reverting component at a relatively short 
horizon could have little effect on major swings of the stock market. 
Since it is mean reverting, it has a long-run impulse response that dies 
out. It  cannot make any contribution to the variance at some 
sufficiently long horizon. The impulse responses of non-stationary 
components-permanent shifts in either levels or growth rates-w ill 
dominate the behavior of the dividend process at sufficiently long 
horizons.
To demonstrate this, replace equation (5) with a more general 
process:
(9) Ad. e. + X 't ’ f , :  + Z ,» -0
H  i=i
6)e.-i + S0
Équation (9) includes in the dividend process a short-run mean- 
reverting component covering the firs t m periods, for values of the <j>j 
coefficients less than zero.
figure 7 plots actual stock prices and two sets of "warranted" 
prices-one from figure b with 0= 97, and one with 0= 97, m=&, and the 
(jij parameters set equal to the f irs t eight autocorrelations of dividend 
growth. With these parameters, more than tO percent of shocks to the 



























































































the mean-reverting component. Yet the effect on the long swings in 
"warranted" prices is small. Tine two "warranted" series plotted are 
much closer together than are the warranted series for different 
values of 0 in figures 5 and b.
Figure 7
Warranted Prices w ith  and without Short-Run Mean Reversion
from the standpoint of the effect on the pattern of long swings in 
stock prices, small changes in Q-in the magnitude of permanent shocks 
to long-run dividend growth-overwhelm large shifts in the degree of 
short-run mean reversion. The presence of short-run mean-reversion in 
levels is not cause to neglect the possibility of long-run permanent 
shocks to growth rates.
D. Implications
A possible conclusion to draw is that to ask i f  stock prices have 
been rational forecasts of fundamentals is to ask an unanswerable 
question. There is a view of the process generating dividends-the view 




























































































prices that conformed much more closely to what the actual ex post 
realized values turned out to be. There are also defensible views 
(0=.97) justifying the long swings seen as the best the market could do 
ex ante, given its lack of knowledge about and need to estimate 
possibly time-varying long run rates of dividend growth. There are even 
defensible views (0= 95) that much wider swings would have been 
perfectly reasonable given investors' lack of timely information about 
the dividend process.22
Given the uncertainty today about how to model the evolution of 
dividends over the past century, it seems rash to find investors in some 
sense culpable when the implicit forecasts reflected in market prices 
do not correspond to a particular favorite model. I t  is perhaps better 
to argue that information was so scarce that it would be surprising i f  
investors had been able to construct good forecasts.
IV. Conclusion
Over the past century the stock market has been at times twice, and 
at times half, of what its ex post perfect-foresight fundamental 
turned out to be. Long swings in stock prices are associated with and 
proportionately larger than long swings in dividends, fo r  twenty-year 
changes, each one percent shift in dividends is associated with a I .b 
percent shift in actual stock prices-and with almost no shift at all in 
the perfect-foresight fundamental.
This paper has proposed a model in which these large long-run 
swings in the stock market arise because investors extrapolate past
22Not to mention the views that argue that there was no single generating process- 
instead, a unique catastrophe (the Great Depression) and at least two different 




























































































dividend growth info the future. Such a procedure would be reasonable. 
Investors are uncertain of the structure of the economy, and they have 
to form their own forecasts of the possibly changing long-run dividend 
growth rate. In a context in which the long-run rate of dividend growth 
is an uncertain and possibly changing parameter that investors must 
estimate-not a known const ant-investors should estimate warranted 
values by forecasting dividend growth from a moving average of past 
dividend changes. Such an extrapolative estimation procedure would 
have led to fluctuations in warranted values as large as and in phase 
with actual bull and bear swings of the past century.23
An alternative interpretation of such possible extrapolation of past 
dividend growth into the future is that the resulting large swings in 
stock prices are driven not by fundamentals but by "fads and 
fash ionsO ver the past century dividends have exhibited long-run 
mean reversion. Investors have not taken this into account. Under this 
interpretation this paper has given an example of what Shiller [ 1990j 
terms the "popular model“ that describes the not necessarily rational 
expect at ions-based rules of thumb that investors have used over the 
past century to value the market.
'We see no immediate way to distinguish these interpretations using 
this particular data set. I t  is hardly reasonable to require that 
investors in the past place confidence in some particular favorite 
model of a present economist. After all, the economist has chosen this 
model ex post, with the benefit of hindsight.
23Some analogous conclusions have been reached by economists examining stock 
markets in other countries. Bulkley and tonks [I9& 9] argue that once one takes 
account of investors' need to estimate the parameters of the dividend process, the 
post-World War I U.K. stock market does not appear excessively volatile. De Long and 
Becht [1991] note that post-World War II German prices and price/dividend ratios 
reach a peak at the beginning of the 19b0's-just after the end of the rapid growth 
decade of the 1950's, and ju s t before two decades of relatively slow dividend growth- 




























































































Uncertainty about the structure of the economy is substantial. 
Economists today squabble over the proper characterization of the 
dividend process. Many analysts In year like 1929 and 19b2, examining 
the past track of dividend growth and the state of the economy, did 
believe that the economy had entered a new régime of accumulation in 
which economic and dividend growth would be more rapid. These 
judgments were shared by prominent monetary economists at the end 
of the /920's (see fisher [1930]) and by prominent Keynesians in the 
I9b0's (see Tobin and Weidenbaum [1988]). This suggests that i f  
today's economists chose models without using their hindsight, the 
expectations in their models might well appear as grossly inconsistent 
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